Recent genomic studies have revealed the highly polygenic nature of psychiatric disorders, including schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and major depressive disorder. Many of the individual genetic associations are shared across multiple disorders in a way that points to extensive biological pleiotropy and further challenges the biological validity of existing diagnostic approaches. Here we argue that the existence of risk alleles specific to a single diagnostic category is unlikely. We also highlight some of the important clinical repercussions of pleiotropy.
Psychiatric diagnosis
The making of a psychiatric diagnosis. Psychiatric diagnoses are made on the basis of patient descriptions of their subjective experiences (for example, energy, mood, perception, beliefs and appetite) and from observations of behavior (for example, bizarre activity, attention, self-care and social interaction) made by clinicians or reported by informants (for example, family members or caretakers, neighbors and teachers). Other factors are taken into consideration, including functional impairment, developmental trajectory and outcome. Ultimately, a diagnosis is assigned to individuals who exhibit a minimum number of symptoms, behaviors or outcomes, usually for a minimum period of time, with the provision that they do not meet criteria that exclude that diagnosis. The exclusion criteria are often subjective, requiring clinicians to judge that the clinical picture is not 'better accounted for' by another diagnosis, or that the picture is not 'clearly caused by' the effects of a psychoactive agent, for example. In clinical practice, experience and intuition have a role, although semi-standardized data-acquisition tools and operationalized diagnostic criteria have been developed to minimize the impact of these subjective factors. These are used primarily in research, but they are sometimes employed to aid diagnosis in the clinic (for example, the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule).
The validity of psychiatric diagnosis. As research data have accumulated, it has become clear that the boundaries between diagnostic groups and between illness and wellness are not clear-cut; that there is considerable heterogeneity within diagnostic categories; that patients often have the clinical features of more than one disorder 3 ; and that the preponderance of those features in a particular individual can change markedly over time and with development. Even with the most fastidious application of diagnostic criteria, there is no avoiding the fact that none of the clinical features is pathognomonic. For example, the occurrence of psychotic symptoms such as hallucinations and delusions, mood changes and alterations in speech, activity level, behavior and sleep can indicate a diagnosis of either schizophrenia or bipolar disorder (BD). The frequent co-occurrence of symptoms that could imply either major diagnostic label has led to a third category: schizoaffective disorder. Archetypal versions of each diagnosis exist, but for a large number of people, the distinction is based on relatively subjective judgments about the duration, quality and severity of component signs and symptoms 4 . Outcome within diagnostic groups also varies widely; some people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, for example, remain chronically symptomatic and impaired, whereas others make a complete recovery 5 .
F O C U S O N P S Y C H I AT R I C D I S O R D E R S p e r s p e c t i v e
Finally, as better-powered epidemiological studies have been carried out, it has become clear that the relatives of an individual with one psychiatric diagnosis are at increased risk for other diagnoses, which undermines the genetic validity of current diagnostic approaches 6 .
Biomarkers. There have been extensive efforts to identify biomarkers that index pathogenic mechanisms, including studies of blood markers (for example, metabolites, cytokines or cortisol suppression), behavioral and cognitive measures and various neuroimaging modalities 7 . However, this work has failed to deliver markers that can distinguish reliably between diagnoses and has similarly failed to identify disease subgroups. Currently, there are no biomarkers in routine clinical use. For example, despite the extensive use of ever more sophisticated neuroimaging approaches, no measures have emerged that can separate people with a particular diagnosis from healthy individuals, much less distinguish between those with different diagnoses 8 .
Molecular genetic findings in psychiatry
The robust identification of risk factors for psychiatric disease, in the form of DNA variation, has been eagerly awaited for the insights that this might provide into the basic biological architecture of and relationships between psychiatric phenotypes, as well as for its contributions to understanding disease mechanisms. In the past few years, genomic studies have begun to identify risk alleles in large numbers; currently, success is largely confined to ASD, schizophrenia and, to lesser extent, BD and major depressive disorder (MDD). Other psychiatric phenotypes have yet to be subjected to large-scale genome-wide studies.
In ASD, the evidence implicating specific risk genes comes primarily from mutations that occur de novo in the form of large insertion-deletion mutations called copy number variants (CNVs), or rare coding variants (RCVs) that change the DNA sequence at a single or a few nucleotides. A recent synthesis of the ASD data (5,563 cases for de novo RCVs and 4,687 cases for CNVs) reported highconfidence associations with 65 genes and an additional six CNV loci 9 . All loci identified thus far confer large effects on risk. However, with population risk allele frequencies of less than one in a 1,000, this might simply reflect insufficient power to detect smaller effect sizes. It should also be noted that there is emerging evidence that common genetic variation makes a substantial contribution to the variance in liability to ASD 10 , although individual common alleles have not yet been robustly implicated.
For schizophrenia, identified risk alleles span the full spectrum of frequencies. The largest analysis of genome-wide association study (GWAS) data (up to 36,989 cases and 113,075 controls) identified a total of 108 loci that contain common alleles 11 , and analysis of rare CNVs (12,029-21,269 cases; 24,815-81,821 controls) identified 11 strongly supported loci 12 . The latter was largely based on a meta-analysis of candidate CNVs, and a systematic genome-wide CNV meta-analysis is awaited. Exome-sequencing studies in schizophrenia have been smaller than those in ASD, and the evidence for RCVs is restricted largely to enrichments in pathways rather than specific genes 13, 14 , although recently, a meta-analysis (4,264 schizophrenia cases, 9,343 controls and 1,077 parent-proband trios) obtained genome-wide significance association between schizophrenia and loss-of-function (LoF) RCVs in a gene that encodes the histone methyltransferase SETD1A (ref. 15) . That study also reported a specific mutation in SETD1A that occurred in people with the disorder as a de novo mutation at a frequency much in excess of that expected by chance, which provides confidence for pathogenicity of that specific mutation.
For BD, GWAS and rare-variant data sets are smaller than those of schizophrenia. The largest GWAS study (9,747 patients and 14,278 controls) identified five risk loci, whereas, at the rare-variant end of the spectrum, the only finding that meets a statistical threshold equivalent to genome-wide significance is a duplication CNV at 16p 11.2 (ref. 16 ). Finally, a recent GWAS 17 based on MDD, as self-reported by customers of a consumer-genetics company, identified 15 loci for the disorder. It is notable that so few loci were identified in a study that included up to 130,620 cases and 347,620 controls. This underscores the fact that although sample size might be crucial for discovery genetics, it is not the only factor. Differences in other properties of disorders (for example, disease prevalence, heterogeneity, phenotype definition or variance in risk contributed by individual alleles) can have a major impact.
Pleiotropy
The nature of pleiotropy. The meaning of pleiotropy ( Fig. 1) depends on context 18, 19 . We refer to genic pleiotropy when the altered function of a gene influences multiple traits (note that the term trait includes phenotypes that are not necessarily abnormal or symptoms of disorders). Allelic pleiotropy, a subtype of genic pleiotropy, occurs when the same gene variant influences multiple traits. This is exemplified by phenylketonuria (PKU), in which causative mutations are pleiotropic for intellectual disability, lack of pigmentation and various metabolic changes that can be measured in the blood. These two forms of biological pleiotropy, genic and allelic, suggest shared biology between disorders, but this is not the only potential explanation.
Mediated pleiotropy occurs when an allele influences two traits, but its effects on one are secondary to more direct effects on the other. For example, genetic variation at the fat-mass-and obesity-associated (FTO) locus is pleiotropic for body-mass index (BMI) and type 2 diabetes (T2D), but the effects on T2D are secondary to those on BMI. In the case of PKU, the effects on intellectual function and pigmentation are mediated by the effects on the metabolic traits. As in these examples, mediated pleiotropy can be informative for understanding causal pathways to disease, and as we shall see, it is often implicitly assumed in endophenotype studies. The mediating relationship between the two traits can be complex, however, and does not necessarily imply that the two phenotypes share biological mechanisms.
There are also numerous sources of false or pseudo-pleiotropy. Pseudo-pleiotropy can arise as a result of imprecision in gene mapping, wherein two phenotypes are influenced by different genes in close proximity ( Fig. 1) , but it can also arise from poor study design, associations that are due to chance (type I errors) or publication biases favoring reports of overlaps.
Pleiotropy in psychiatry and developmental disorders. Evidence for cross-disorder effects of genetic variation has come from studies showing that CNVs that influence risk for schizophrenia also often do so for ASD, intellectual disability (ID), developmental delay ( Fig. 2) and ADHD 20 . The majority of these seemingly pleiotropic CNVs are multigenic, and we cannot therefore exclude pseudopleiotropy, in which distinct genes in the CNV cause each associated phenotype ( Fig. 1) . However, the observation that every CNV known to increase risk of schizophrenia also does so for ID 21 makes colocalization alone an unlikely explanation. Moreover, the only 'single gene' CNV that is unequivocally associated with schizophrenia-deletion of the gene NRXN1 encoding the pre-synaptic protein neurexin 1-is also associated with ASD and with ID 22 . Sequencing studies have shown p e r s p e c t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e that as a group, genes influenced by LoF de novo mutations in schizophrenia are enriched for those affected by this same class of mutation in people with ASD and ID 13 . Moreover, several genes have been definitively implicated by de novo LoF mutations in both developmental delay and ASD 9, 23 , and at an even finer level of resolution, the same LoF mutation in SETD1A that contributes high risk of schizophrenia also does so for severe ID and developmental delay 15 .
The hypothesis of true pleiotropy in psychiatric and developmental disorders is also supported by common variants identified by GWAS. The International Schizophrenia Consortium (ISC) showed that hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of common alleles that increase risk for schizophrenia also do so for BD 24 , and it is now clear that they also do so for MDD, and to a lesser extent, ASD, ADHD, anorexia nervosa and OCD (Fig. 3) , as well as personality traits such as neuroticism [25] [26] [27] . A problem with inferring biological pleiotropy from GWASs is that the functional alleles (i.e., the alleles that change the function or expression of the gene and directly cause the association) responsible for the vast majority of the GWAS associations have not been identified. It is therefore possible that for any single cross-disorder association, different functional variants within the same or different genes might be responsible. However, the substantial genetic correlations between pairs of psychiatric phenotypes (Fig. 3) are less readily explained by pseudo-pleiotropy because this would require different functional alleles to be systematically and consistently tagged by the same GWAS allele across large numbers of loci.
When the genomic data are taken as a whole, true pleiotropy is by far the most parsimonious explanation for the majority of published cross-disorder effects, and most of the findings support extensive allelic pleiotropy. A proviso here is that we must exclude mediated pleiotropy as an explanation. By definition, for one trait to be secondary to (or mediated by) another, the mediating trait must occur first. It follows that childhood-onset disorders (for example, ADHD) cannot be mediated by disorders with typically later ages of onset (for example, schizophrenia or MDD). However, it is theoretically possible that the converse is true, and that where alleles are pleiotropic for ID, schizophrenia and ASD, ID is the primary phenotype influenced by those alleles, and that having ID causally increases the risk of developing ASD and schizophrenia. There is certainly evidence that in people with psychiatric disorders, CNVs and de novo LoF mutations occur more frequently in those who have cognitive impairment than in those who do not 9, 13, 28 , an observation that has sometimes been interpreted as indicative of pleiotropy mediated by ID. However, this pattern of co-morbidity is not sufficient to establish mediated pleiotropy; indeed, it is to be expected in cases in which mutations have direct effects on two phenotypes. There are also powerful arguments against mediated pleiotropy as the sole explanation for this. First, in ASD, LoF de novo mutations tend to occur in the same sets of genes in probands with and without intellectual disability 9 . Second, at SETD1A, although LoF mutations are associated with both ID and schizophrenia, ID is not a prerequisite for schizophrenia in people who carry a mutation 15 . Third, ID is not universally seen in people with schizophrenia who carry de novo CNVs that are pleiotropic for both disorders 29 . Fourth, in the only study of which we are aware that has explicitly undertaken formal mediation analyses on the basis of a rare variant, the 22q11 deletion CNV was found to have independent effects on cognitive and psychiatric traits (for example, ADHD and ASD) 30 . The rare-variant data are therefore inconsistent with the hypothesis that cross-disorder findings are explained by mediated rather than allelic pleiotropy. The common variant findings are more complex and will be considered further below. . Accordingly, the SNP will be associated with both phenotypes that are caused by those functional variants. The SNP is depicted midpoint between the genes, but could be positioned anywhere in the region of LD, including in one of the genes. This is pseudo-pleiotropy resulting from co-localization. This region is also prone to a deletion CNV, which results in complete loss of function of both genes, by virtue of which it is associated with all five phenotypes. In a literal sense, all of the green phenotypes in this instance are now examples of allelic pleiotropy (directly caused by the same CNV allele at a single locus). 32 . What might then be perceived as pleiotropic manifestations of a particular mutation (for example, a CNV) might in fact more generally represent the net effects of an individual's polygenic and environmental background on multiple traits representing various domains of brain function.
Specific genes for psychiatric diagnoses
Whether it is possible to link genotype to psychiatric phenotype is generally couched in terms of linear relationships between a gene and a single categorical diagnosis. In our opinion, the evidence summarized above suggests that the outlook for relating genotype and phenotype in this way is not promising, although we recognize that there is a bias toward observing pleiotropy because studies are better powered to identify genetic similarities than they are differences. We do not suggest that risk alleles affect psychiatric outcomes indiscriminately. For example, duplication at 22q11 increases the risk of ID and ASD, but is neutral for bipolar disorder and protective against schizophrenia 33 . Damaging rare mutations have a greater role in ID than in schizophrenia 13 ; in schizophrenia as compared to mood disorder 16 ; and in psychiatric disorders, those who are comorbid for cognitive impairment, as compared with those who are not 9, 13, 28 . With regard to common alleles, although many psychiatric disorders are genetically correlated, the degree of correlation between diagnostic classes is usually less than the degree of within-disorder correlation 26, 34 . These observations suggest that current diagnostic schemes do, to some extent, capture groups whose members have more in common with each other than they do members of a general class 'psychiatric disorder' . However, until we can directly measure liability, it is impossible to distinguish the phenotypic heterogeneity arising from true pleiotropic effects of a specific allele (even an allele of large effect) from that resulting from a person's unique blend of risk factors. Directly measuring liability remains a distant goal; for now, a more realistic aim is the identification of alternative approaches to patient stratification that index liability better than current diagnostic categories, and therefore, that might link more specifically to particular genotypes. Some approaches to doing so are outlined in Box 1.
Implications of pleiotropy
The current system of psychiatric classification is not optimal, and alternative approaches are urgently required for clinical and fundamental research. The genetic findings do not, however, imply a similar urgency for fundamental changes in clinical practice because they do not provide the basis for a system with clear clinical value. Given the complexity of the relationships between disorders and the likelihood that people with psychiatric illnesses differ quantitatively rather than categorically on multiple dimensions of function, seeking hard categorical boundaries that validly reflect etiology seems to be a fool's errand. Ultimately, we suspect that advances in genomic research will enable pathophysiological processes to be mapped to domains of brain function (perhaps those outlined in RDoC; perhaps not) and between domains of brain function and the clinical picture, and in so doing, will allow for clinical measurements (for example, types of cognitive test or brain imaging) that highlight perturbations that are pertinent to and suggest interventions for particular groups of patients (Box 1). But which measures are likely to best achieve this-much less how to implement them in a clinical setting-is far from clear. Nevertheless, even now, the pervasive nature of shared risk factors, pleiotropy and arbitrary diagnostic boundaries between disorders has clinical implications.
As clinicians, we recognize the utility of diagnostic boundaries for therapeutic decision making, communication and predicting (in a general way) certain outcomes, and we do not suggest that clinicians abandon diagnosis according to existing categories. However, rigid adherence to categories makes it easy to either overlook comorbidity or, where it is detected, to inappropriately ascribe it to a diagnosis that has greater weight in the current diagnostic hierarchy. As a result, comorbid syndromes might not be optimally treated. Given that pleiotropy implies that a person with one syndrome is at enhanced risk for a second syndrome, far from implying lax assessment, pleiotropy emphasizes the need for detailed on-going clinical monitoring and assessments that go beyond the bare requirements of arriving at the best-fitting diagnostic category. Moreover, by appreciating the increasing empirical basis for pleiotropy, clinicians can better engage in discussion with patients, who are often bewildered by the range of diagnoses that they might receive across their lifespans. Clinicians in other medical disciplines would not assign to a single clinical entity all the physical ailments associated with a pleotropic risk factor such as smoking, and there is no reason why psychiatrists should either.
Children with congenital malformations, developmental delay or ASD are already being referred for molecular diagnostics, particularly for known pathogenic CNVs, but as the data continue to accumulate, more types of genetic finding will be incorporated. It has been argued that CNV testing should be offered to people with other p e r s p e c t i v e forms of psychiatric disorders; for now, the case is strongest for schizophrenia 35 , but we predict that ADHD is likely to follow suit. The range of arguments for and against this are beyond the scope of this article 36 ; here we note that identifying carriers of high-penetrance mutations is currently of limited value in psychiatry for precision medicine, but should testing be offered for counseling or predictive purposes, it would be important to consider the pleiotropic effects of mutations. CNVs detected in children referred for testing may have important adult psychiatric implications, and conversely, if adults are tested, pleiotropy has implications for their children and other relatives. The counseling challenges are substantial given the wide range of possible outcomes, and much of the data that are required to do this with precision-even for well-documented pathogenic CNVs-is lacking. The extensive pleiotropy revealed by psychiatric genetics also has important implications for interpreting mechanistic studies, whether in humans, using endophenotypes (Box 1), or in animal and cellular models. Even for high-penetrance alleles, the possibility of pleiotropy implies the need for caution in ascribing a causal role in disease for particular brain-imaging correlates of that mutation, or in a rodent or stem cell model, neurobiological outcomes. This issue has been discussed conceptually in the case of human endophenotypes and some of the statistical approaches to identifying mediation outlined 37, 38 . Interpreting results from model systems is more challenging and will require researchers to cast the net wider than is often the case in seeking the consequences of genetic risk factors, and to relate their findings to comparable findings from clinical neuroscience. This will require the use of translatable measures and direct comparisons of the effects of genetic risk across levels of complexity 3 .
Finally, on a positive note, pleiotropy might offer unsuspected therapeutic opportunities if it turns out that this is reflected in shared pathophysiology. It is not uncommon for psychiatrists to offer to patients with a particular diagnosis treatments (off-label) that are known to be effective for a different psychiatric disorder. In a very general sense, pleiotropy can be seen as offering some post hoc justification for this, although, we stress, not currently at the level of any specific treatment. As new treatments are developed to target one disorder, it is likely that treatment will have a broader therapeutic role, and that wider patient populations could benefit from advances in research into a particular disorder. 
Box 1 Patient stratification
There is general agreement that we need new approaches to patient stratification in research if we are to better understand genephenotype relationships, accelerate understanding of etiology and pathogenesis and inform mechanistic studies and treatment trials. Generally speaking, three ways in which we can move beyond the constraints of current diagnostic approaches have been proposed. Rather than being mutually exclusive, these can be thought of as targeting psychiatric disorders at different levels of conceptual and etiological complexity, from the molecular at one end to the function and behavior of the whole human at the other. Models that attempt to capture this hierarchical complexity have been proposed and discussed in detail elsewhere 3 .
First, we can use clinical classifications to define strata that cut across or divide current diagnostic groups. The strata might be based on the presence or absence of particular symptoms (for example, hallucinations), syndromes (for example, psychosis, depression) or other features, such as course or outcome. This approach might aid the identification of risk factors and pathogenic mechanisms, providing that the strata map more closely onto these than do current diagnostic groupings. It also has the potential to help our understanding of the basis of heterogeneity. There is some evidence to support this type of approach: for example, the stratification of people with bipolar disorder for the presence of psychotic symptoms predicts a higher burden of schizophrenia-associated risk alleles, and conversely, the stratification of people with schizophrenia for the presence of manic-type symptoms predicts a higher burden of bipolar-disorder-associated risk alleles 40, 41 . These preliminary findings suggest that across disorders, sets of syndromes have some shared biological basis, and support a model in which disorders, as manifest in individuals, might be viewed as the confluence of partly orthogonal symptom dimensions.
Second, stratification can be based on the presence of a particular etiological factor (for example, a rare high-penetrance mutation or a particular environmental exposure) rather than clinical features. The assumption is that constraining the risk architecture will increase biological homogeneity and enable researchers to focus on specific risk mechanisms and understand what factors lead to different outcomes, including resilience as well as risk. This type of approach also lends itself to complementary studies in cells and animals, as well as humans. In psychiatry, this has yet to yield unqualified success, and given the evolutionary multi-purposing of proteins-which may have different functions in different cells or cell compartments-even a single genetic variant might map onto different pathogenic mechanisms in carriers. Although this is a theoretical concern, the fact that, regardless of the specific psychiatric diagnoses (ID, ASD, schizophrenia), rare de novo and LoF mutations tend to affect broadly similar processes (for example, glutamatergic pathways regulating synaptic plasticity, chromatin modifiers and targets of fragile X mental retardation protein) suggests that individual mutations are likely to influence the same pathogenic mechanisms across disorders 13 .
Third, in attempting to relate risk factors and clinical phenotypes to underlying pathophysiology and mechanisms, stratification can be performed at the level of endophenotypes (intermediate phenotypes). One problem with this approach is the large number of potential endophenotypes, including measures of cognition, brain structure, electrophysiology and biochemistry. Moreover, initial claims that endophenotypes are likely to be less complex genetically than clinical disorders have not in general been supported 42 , and perhaps this explains why failures to link endophenotypes to genetic risk 43 are, for now, more notable than any reproducible successes. Nevertheless, this approach offers a means by which genetic risk can be linked to disturbances of brain function, and a framework for doing so has been implemented in the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) project of the National Institutes of Mental Health 44 . The pleiotropic effects of many risk alleles are clear reminders that there are pitfalls associated with using this approach to chart the pathways that mediate the effects of genetic risk on clinical phenotypes (see main text). p e r s p e c t i v e nature medicine VOLUME 22 | NUMBER 11 | NOVEMBER 2016
